A gray zone influence campaign alone will not force Taiwan to reunite with the motherland. However, over many years, China's expansion of military, paramilitary, and civilian operations into Taiwan-controlled areas could achieve certain intermediate goals—most importantly, prevent the island from achieving formal independence—while preserving Beijing's ability to use force later.
If Beijing's gray zone “campaign” goes unopposed, it may also demonstrate the limits of US power in Asia.
For example, the United States and its allies are unlikely to deploy advanced missile systems in the region if China never presents a clear casus belli in the form of an invasion. Alternatively, US leaders can debate whether China has crossed a red line. Since Washington is hampered by uncertainty about how far China wants to push gray zone tactics, most of the responsibility will fall on Taiwan. Foreign affairs On its columns Isaac Cardone And Jennifer Kavanaghsenior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
The United States must also stop waiting forever to invade, and pay more attention to the dangers of Taiwan's slow asphyxiation. Washington should support Taipei's efforts by increasing Taiwan's surveillance capabilities, expanding the role of the U.S. Coast Guard in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and coordinating with trade players who may feel pressure to comply with Beijing. If current trends continue, Taiwan's autonomy and US credibility are likely to decline significantly.
Collect clouds
In the past decade, China has become increasingly prominent in the air, water and information space of East Asia. The Coast Guard and other maritime law enforcement vessels controlled disputed waters around Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and Vietnam. In the first months of 2024, Chinese Coast Guard ships conducted maneuvers to block supplies to a military outpost in the Philippines, Chinese diplomats in the Gulf of Tonkin violated international maritime law, and Chinese ships threatened Japanese aircraft flying over the Diaoyu Islands (Japan is known). Like the Senkaku Islands) it operated in Japanese sovereign airspace around.
These measures reflect the fundamental intention of the Chinese rule of law in the disputed areas. The ongoing stifling of Hong Kong's autonomy resembles Beijing's maritime strategy. China has used legal measures to expand its effective control over important aspects of Hong Kong's governance – all without resorting to military force.
Taiwan has become a target of activities that resemble China's repertoire of gray areas in the South China Sea and East China Sea. Since January 2022, China's air force has conducted nearly three times as many strikes in Taiwan's air defense identification zone (the area where aircraft are required to identify themselves to Taiwanese authorities) than between 2018 and 2021, according to daily reports from the Ministry of Defense. Taiwanese National Defence. defense. Beijing has also regularly sent ships and planes across the middle line of the Taiwan Strait, ignoring the actual border established in 1955.
The Chinese military increased the number, intensity, and duration of sniper training, effectively cordoning off the island. China's information warfare capabilities also play a prominent role in its gray zone operational concept. Beijing has been saturating Taiwanese media with disinformation, and is suspected of cutting undersea internet cables to remote islands controlled by Taiwan.
We should not view China's gray zone activities in the Taiwan Strait as merely a prelude to invasion. Beijing's continued use of similar tactics in nearby waters indicates this
These actions are part of a patient, long-term strategy to subjugate Taiwan without invasion.
With this approach, China seeks to isolate the island from its control over the surrounding waters and airspace and limit its ability to make independent military, diplomatic, and economic decisions. Steps in this direction would fall short of the full occupation that a successful invasion would require. However, such a campaign could yield similar results, and Beijing could keep Taiwan under control without requiring a formal surrender, the authors write.
Russia's failure in blitzkrieg after invading Ukraine in 2022 clearly reinforces the attractiveness of this strategy. Since 2022, Beijing has shown an increasing interest in cheaper and less risky actions, which may reflect a realization that a quick military victory over Taiwan will be difficult in the wake of Moscow's conflicts. China could tighten the screws, adding more Coast Guard units to patrol, covering increasingly wider areas of the Taiwan Strait, or imposing customs and quarantine procedures to restrict trade.
These potential operations would not differ significantly from activities Beijing has already undertaken, for example, around Kinmen Island. Such measures do not constitute a blockade in the operational or legal sense, but they achieve a similar goal and preserve the possibility for China to launch a more comprehensive military campaign in the future.
(Cover photo: Taiwanese soldiers train in Taiwan on July 27, 2022. Photo: Annabelle Cheh/Getty Images)
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